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IMPACT OF NON-AUDIT ASSURANCE LEVEL 
(COMPILATION VERSUS REVIEW) ON PRODUCTION 
MANAGEMENT OF PRIVATE MANUFACTURING 
COMPANIES 
Benjamin P. Foster, University of Louisville 
ABSTRACT 
Private small companies have been the subject of much interest by accounting regulators 
recently. The AICPA issued SSARS 19 and the Financial Reporting Framework for Small- and 
Medium-Sized Entities in 2009 and 2013, respectively. The Financial Accounting Foundation 
issued the Blue Ribbon Panel Report on Standard Setting for Private Companies in 2011. This is 
apparently the first study to compare reporting practices of small private companies whose 
financial statements are compiled or reviewed. 
Overall results indicate that reviewed companies tend to exhibit positive abnormal 
production while compiled companies tend to exhibit negative abnormal production. However, 
for the companies most likely to engage in earnings management, only separately taxable reviewed 
entities tend to manage earnings higher to meet earnings benchmarks. External users of 
reviewed and compiled statements should be aware of the tendencies of the different types of 
entities to manage production and inventory levels. 
INTRODUCTION 
The AICPA (2013) recently issued its Financial Reporting Framework for Small- and 
Medium-Sized Entities (FRF for SMEs).  The Framework resulted from concerns that traditional 
GAAP statements were expensive and perhaps not useful or relevant to relatively small business 
enterprises.  This Framework and the Blue Ribbon Panel Report on Standard Setting for Private 
Companies from the Financial Accounting Foundation (2011) indicate a heightened interest in 
financial reporting by relatively small business entities, sometimes called the Big GAAP/Little 
GAAP debate (Burton and Hillison 1979; Grusd 2006; Thrower 2010; Wright et al. 2012). 
However, a paucity of research has been conducted on United States companies' non-audited 
financial statements. 
 This study focuses on financial reporting for private companies whose financial statements 
have been provided non-audit-level assurance (reviewed) or no assurance (compiled) by 
independent accountants.   Information obtained from Sageworks Incorporated’s privately held 
company database was used for analyses.   The Sageworks database contains many data items 
for some included private companies.  However, many observations from reviewed or compiled 
data lack information on many items necessary to construct complex earnings management 
measures used in previous research. 
 Most private manufacturers in the Sageworks database provide sufficient information to 
examine one form of earnings management through inventory and production decisions. Only 
manufacturers can substantially increase or decrease reported income by adjusting work in process 
and finished goods inventories to time the expensing of fixed manufacturing costs. 
Consequently, due to data limitations, I focus on use of this real earnings management technique 
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manufacturing industries. Following previous studies (Gunny 2010; Chien et al. 2011; Cohen et al. 
2008; Roychowdhury 2006), I use an abnormal production measure to examine whether 
differences exist in production levels between statements possessing the different assurance levels. 
I also examine whether the tax status (separately taxed or pass-through entities) of these 
companies impacts their abnormal production. 
SSARS  10,  Performance  of  Review  Engagements  (AICPA  2004),  issued  in  2004, 
provided substantial clarification and guidance for independent accountants’ review services. 
One major change was that this standard required accountants performing review services to 
make specific fraud related inquiries of management and expanded documentation requirements. 
My sample comes from financial statements impacted by SSARS 10:  4,883 yearly observations of 
2,709 private companies over the period of 2005-2008 from the Sageworks database.  (Note: 
Sageworks made entity-level data available to researchers for a short period of time, but their 
data is no longer publicly available other than in summary form.) 
I find that abnormal production differs between companies whose financial statements were 
reviewed and those whose statements were compiled.   Overall, financial statements that were 
reviewed tend to exhibit relatively more income-increasing abnormal production than compiled 
financial statements, while compiled financial statements tend to exhibit relatively more 
income-decreasing abnormal production than reviewed statements.  Overall, abnormal production  
in  reviewed  and  compiled  statements  does  not  appear  to  be  impacted  by 
organizational tax status.  I also examine abnormal production of manufacturing companies most 
likely to have an incentive to engage in earnings management.  Reviewed taxable companies just 
meeting earnings benchmarks exhibit significantly higher abnormal production, but this behavior is 
not evident for other company groups. 
 The next section of this article contains a review of related literature and a discussion 
explaining my hypotheses. The following sections describe the sample, explain statistical methods, 
and discuss results of empirical analysis. The article ends with a conclusions section. 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Financial reporting quality has been examined in conjunction with earnings management in 
financial statements.  One method of earnings management (sometimes referred to as real 
activities management) involves managing operational activities to impact bottom line earnings. 
Roychowdhury (2006) and Gunny (2010) found that companies use real activities management 
to avoid reporting losses or just meeting earnings benchmarks.  Real activities management has 
direct cash flow consequences that may negatively affect future operating performance (Gunny 
2010; Zhao et al. 2012). 
 Examples of real activities management include: offering unusual price discounts at end 
of a period to increase sales, reducing selling, general, and administrative expenses (SG&A), 
reducing research and development expenditures, and decreasing or increasing production and 
inventory levels to increase or decrease costs of goods sold.  Several studies have found such 
activities have impacted short-term reported earnings of publicly-traded companies (e.g. Cohen 
et al. 2008; Cohen et al. 2010; Eldenburg et al. 2011; Gunny 2010;  Roychowdhury 2006; 
Thomas and Zhang 2002; Zhao et al. 2012).  Due to data limitations, I focus on one method of 
real activities management: decreasing or increasing production and inventory levels to increase or 
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Level of Assurance 
I also limit the sample to privately held companies whose financial statements were either 
compiled or reviewed by an independent accountant to focus on whether an independent 
accountant’s review helps to reduce earnings management through actual production and inventory 
decisions or reporting decisions.  Barefield, et al. (1993) found that economic forces impacting 
the market for audit services also apply to compilation and review services.  Demand for review 
services increased with the size of the client and the existence of accounting based loan 
covenants.   They also found that accountants charged significantly more for review engagements 
than for compilations.  Like audit engagements, Munter and Tatum (1994) found that 
accountants conducting SSARS engagements apparently consider, at least implicitly, inherent and 
control risk factors. 
 Reinstein et al. ( 2006) noted that for some time, CPAs have worried that financial 
statement  users  place  too  much  confidence  in  limited-assurance  statements  prepared  for 
nonpublic entities.  Based on a survey of practicing CPAs and bankers, they concluded that both 
groups had more confidence in relying on financial statements for decision making when a CPA 
was somehow associated with the statements. In 2004, the AICPA (2004) offered substantial 
clarification and guidance related to review services in SSARS 10, Performance of Review 
Engagements. This standard required specific fraud related inquiries of management and clarified 
and expanded documentation requirements for review engagements. Most of my data comes 
from years in which SSARS 10 would be in effect for review engagements. I present the following 
hypotheses (in the null form): 
 
H1a Reviewed financial statements for private-taxable companies and those compiled for axable 
companies exhibit similar levels of abnormal production. 
 
 H1b Reviewed financial statements for private pass-through entities and those compiled for pass- 
through entities exhibit similar levels of abnormal production. 
Tax Status 
Private company owners have several options for the legal form of their business entities. 
Publicly-traded corporations are formed as C Corporations under Internal Revenue Service 
regulations and pay separate income taxes at the corporate level. IRS (2013) statistics indicate 
that C Corporations are much more likely to be audited by the IRS than are other business 
entities. Owners of C Corporations are taxed directly only on dividends distributed from the 
company. According to the IRS (2011) data, only 5.7% of companies filing tax returns with the 
Internal Revenue Service in 2008 were C corporations. Consequently, most privately held 
companies in the United States are not organized as C Corporations. 
 Other legal forms available for private companies include: incorporating as an S 
corporation or limited liability corporation (LLC), forming as a limited liability partnership 
(LLP) or other form of partnership, and individual ownership. Earnings of these other legal 
forms of business are not generally taxed at the entity level; earnings typically flow through to 
owners and are included on owners' individual income tax returns. Consequently, legal forms 
other than a C-corporation can reduce the combined tax liability of a business and its owners, 
which  can  produce  different  incentives  for  private  companies  to  adjust  inventory levels  to 
increase or decrease income, depending upon their tax status. 
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H2a Reviewed financial statements for private-taxable companies and reviewed statements for pass- 
through companies exhibit similar levels of abnormal production. 
 
H2b Compiled financial statements for private-taxable companies and compiled statements for pass- 
through companies exhibit similar levels of abnormal production. 
Size of the Company 
 The largest manufacturing company in the Sageworks database for any year had $150 
million in sales. Owner-managers of small private companies might be able to easily adjust 
production and inventory to achieve a desired level of taxable income. Consequently, I also limit 
the sample to manufacturing companies with sales of at least $1 million. Previous research has 
found that earnings management is impacted by company size. Larger companies may 
experience more difficulty manipulating earnings because they have more effective internal 
control over financial reporting and may be subject to closer scrutiny by internal and external 
accountants, and tax auditors. Also, the incentives to increase or decrease income may vary 
between relatively different sized companies. I examine the following hypothesis to investigate 
the size impact on abnormal production: 
 
 H3 The size of private companies with reviewed or compiled financial statements does not impact the 
level of abnormal production. 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSES  
Data 
Sageworks Incorporated maintains a database of private company financial information 
collected from Sageworks' customers (mainly banks and CPA firms) who enter financial statement 
information from their clients/customers into the Sageworks system. Sageworks provides summary  
information  by  industry  segment,  client  size,  and  other  factors  to  their banking and 
accounting firm customers. Sageworks' customers then can compare individual client financial 
statement information to peer company summary information (Minnis 2011). 
For a brief time, Sageworks made firm level data from their database available to 
researchers with companies identified only by an ID number.  The Sageworks data set contains 
many items including: balance sheet and income statement items, calculated ratios, some cash 
flow items, the Level of Assurance provided by independent accountants, industry (NAICS 
code), legal form, and location. The amount of information available varies greatly by company. A 
few companies report all items, while many report only a few items. 
I obtained data for 2001 through 2008 from a Sageworks database.  (The latest year used 
was 2008 because at the time the data set was obtained, complete data for 2009 was not available.)  
My sample selection approach is summarized in Table 1.  The database contained 423,631 
observations for 2001 through 2008.  My research questions deal with production and inventory 
decisions.  Consequently, I limited my analyses to manufacturing companies reporting sales in the 
NAICS codes 311822 to 339999, which included 31,835 observations.  I identified 3,765 of 
these observations as duplicate annual observations or quarterly data.  After dropping those 
observations, 28,070 observations remained.  Relative to later years, years prior to 2005 
contained considerably less observations that had three consecutive years' data necessary for 
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analysis. Sageworks had fewer subscribers during their start-up phase for the data set in the early 
2000s (Minnis  2011). Selection  bias  may  be  present  in  earlier  years;  thus,  I  omitted  all 
observations prior to 2005, leaving 20,542 observations. 
 
 
For small companies, a small manipulation in production and inventory levels could have a 
magnified effect on income. Or conversely, small companies may not be as able to manage 
earnings as larger companies. Consequently, I restricted the sample to companies with sales of 
$1 million or greater. I also needed three consecutive years' data to estimate abnormal production 
for an observation.  These two criteria eliminated another 12,624 observations. 
 Also, to limit my sample to observations in which independent accountants offered a low 
level of assurance, or no assurance on the financial statements, observations were deleted that 
had a data source listed as audited, annualized, company prepared, other, tax return, or left blank. 
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(Only the audited source contained a substantial number of observations.)  In addition, at least 14 
other observations from the same three-digit NAICS code for a year were required for the 
abnormal production calculation. This resulted in the deletion of companies from three-digit 
NAICS codes with few observations.  Deletion of companies with financial statements other than 
those compiled or reviewed by an independent accountant or in a three-digit NAICS code with few 
observations left 5,443 Sageworks observations. 
I followed Minnis (2011) and deleted extreme observations he defined as firm-years where:  
(1) net income, cash flow from operations, or property, plant and equipment, exceeded total 
assets at year-end (2) sales decreased by more than 50% or increased by more than 100%, or (3) 
two times total assets were less than total liabilities. Consequently, 560 observations were deleted 
as extreme, leaving 4,883 private company observations from 2,709 separate companies as a 
sample for the main analysis. 
The sample consists of observations from a broad range of manufacturing industries, with 
over 21% coming from fabricated metal products manufacturing companies and over 15% from 
machinery manufacturing. The percentages of observations by three-digit NAICS codes are similar 
for the sample broken down by reviewed and compiled observations.  The distribution of the 
sample in total and by assurance level (reviewed and compiled) and by tax status (pass-
through and taxable) remains relatively stable from 2005 to 2008. The number of observations 
increases substantially from 2005 to 2006 and from 2006 to 2007; total observations are essentially 
the same for 2007 and 2008. 
Statistical Models 
I used Roychowdhury (2006: 345) equation 4, and Cohen et al. (2008: 766) equation 7, 
within each three-digit NAICS code for each year, to estimate abnormal production. 
 
PRODt,f/At-1,f = α0 + α1(1/ At-1,f) + α2(Salest,f/ At-1,f) + α3(Salechgt,f/ At,f) + (1) 
α3(Salechgt-1,f/ At-1,f) + εt,f 
 
where: PRODt,f = (cost of goods soldt,f + change in inventoryt,f)  
 At-1 = total assets at the beginning of the year, 
Salest = current year net sales, 
Salechgt,f = change in sales during current year, 
Salechgt-1,f = change in sales during previous year, and 
εt,f  = abnormal production (Ab_Prodt) is the error term from the regression; a 
positive  Ab_Prodt   would  increase  income  while  a  negative  Ab_Prodt   would 
reduce income. 
 
To follow analyses similar to Gunny (2010), I also constructed variables to identify 
companies most likely to want to manage their incomes: those wanting to avoid reporting a loss 
or reporting lower net income than that of the previous year. My variables include: (1) MEET_0= 
1 if net income scaled by beginning total assets was less than 0.01, but greater than or equal to 
0.00, (2) MEET_last = 1 if net income of the current year scaled by net income of the previous 
year was less than 0.01, but greater than or equal to 0.00, and (3) the greatest incentive/likelihood 
of engaging in earnings management to increase income would be for any observations falling 
within these categories and consequently were coded as BENCH = 1. 
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I used the following formula, based on Gunny (2010), to examine if companies most 
likely to manage income had different Ab_Prodt than other companies: 
 
Ab_Prodt = α0 + α1(BENCHt) + α2(Size_lnAt-1) + α3(ROAt) + α4(Industryf ) (2) 
+ α5(Yearg) + εt 
 
where: Ab_Prodt was defined as the residual from Equation 1above,  
 BENCHt was defined in the previous paragraph, 
Size_lnAt-1 = the natural log of total assets at the beginning of the year, 
ROAt = income before extraordinary items divided by total assets at the beginning 
of the year, 
Industryf  = 1 if company is in industry f (based on 3-digit NAICS codes), 0 
otherwise, 
and 
Yearg = 1 if the observation is from year g, 0 otherwise. 
 
To compare abnormal production of different groups within the sample, I conducted 
analyses for the sample over all and four subgroups of (1) reviewed taxable companies, (2) 
reviewed pass-through entities, (3) compiled taxable companies, (4) or compiled pass-through 
entities. 
Results 
Table 2 provides the means for the total Sageworks company sample and the four 
subsample groups for variables from Equations 1 and 2.  The null Hypotheses 1a and1b state that 
financial statements that are compiled or reviewed will exhibit similar abnormal production, 
while null Hypotheses 2a  and 2b  state that financial statements for separately taxed companies 
and pass-through entities will exhibit similar abnormal production.  The means for abnormal 
production (Ab_Prod_t) reported in Table 2 for all subsamples are significantly different from 
zero; the means of reviewed groups are positive while the means are negative for the compiled 
groups.  These results provide evidence to support rejection of Hypotheses 1a and1b, but no 
evidence to reject Hypotheses 2a and 2b. 
For the full sample and subsamples, Table 3, Panel A presents the parameter estimates 
and t-statistics resulting from the Model 2 regression analysis (with Ab_Prod_t  as the dependent 
variable).  To keep the table manageable, I report statistics for analyses without the data year or 
three-digit NAICS code indicator variables. BENCHt in Model 2 is designed to measure whether 
companies most likely to manage earnings actually exhibit higher abnormal production. (In 
analyses for overall and for separate sample subgroups, no dummy variables for the data year 
were significant in any model.  No sign or significance on any other variables changed when data 
years were included in the model. The only change of sign or significance when the three-digit 
NAICS codes were included in the model was that the negative t-statistic for Sales_quint_low 
becomes marginally significant in Table 3, Panel B.) 
In line with evidence provided in Table 2, BENCHt exhibits a positive, significant 
parameter estimate for the reviewed taxable group. However, BENCHt parameter estimates are 
insignificant over all and for the other sample subgroups. These results provide support to reject 
H1a which hypothesizes no difference in the abnormal production of reviewed-taxable and 
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compiled-taxable companies. No support is found to reject H1b: no difference between reviewed 
pass-through and compiled pass-through companies. The parameter estimates on BENCHt provide 
evidence to reject hypothesis H2a because tax status appears to influence Ab_Prodt behavior of the 
taxable reviewed group compared to pass-through reviewed companies.  Taxable companies tend 
to manage earnings upward to meet earnings benchmarks. Insignificant parameter estimates for 
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Table 3 (continued) 
 
Variable Definitions: 
BENCHt = 1 if net income scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year was greater than or equal to 
zero, but less than 0.01, or if net income of the current year scaled by net income of the previous 
year was greater than or equal to zero, but less than 0.01, else 0. 
Size_ln_TA = the natural log of total assets at the beginning of the year. 
ROAt = income before extraordinary items divided by total assets at the beginning of the year. 
Sales_quint_low = 1 if observation in the smallest sales quintile, else 0. 




As mentioned previously, motivations to manage earnings may differ depending upon the 
size of the relatively small manufacturing companies included in my sample.  In Table 3, Panel 
A, Size_lnAt-1 indicates that, for reviewed taxable companies, abnormal production decreases as 
size increases. In contrast, reviewed pass-through companies exhibit more abnormal production 
as size increases, at a slightly significant level. Gunny (2010) found insignificant results for a 
similar size variable when examining the abnormal production of public companies. 
Due to the mixed results with Equation 2 reported in Table 3, Panel A, I also examine the 
impact of size with another equation.  Because inclusion in my sample was restricted by sales 
between $1 and $150 million, I replace Size_lnAt-1 with indicator variables for the smallest 
quintile and the largest quintile of companies based on sales. The following equation provides 
another test for size difference impacts on abnormal production. 
 
Ab_Prodt = α0 + α1(BENCHt) + α2(ROAt) + α3(Sales_quint_lowt) + α4(Sales_quint_hight) +  
α5(Industryf) + α6(Yearg) + εt                                                                                                         (2a) 
 
where:  Ab_Prodt, BENCHt, ROAt, Industryf, and Yearg were defined previously, 
Sales_quint_lowt = 1, if the observation falls in the lowest quintile of sales for the 
full sample, 0 otherwise, 
and, 
Sales_quint_hight  = 1, if the observation falls in the highest quintile of sales for 
the full sample, 0 otherwise. 
 
Table 3, Panel B reports the results of these analyses which reveal similar findings to 
those in Panel A. (1) Sales_quint_lowt has a significant positive parameter estimate for the 
reviewed taxable sample while Sales_quint_high is insignificant, and (2) Sales_quint_high has a 
positive and significant parameter estimate for the reviewed pass-through group while 
Sales_quint_low is insignificant. These results are hard to explain. Managers of smaller reviewed 
taxable companies may deliberately manage earnings upward to enhance their ability to increase 
their availability of credit from lenders. Alternatively, larger reviewed taxable companies face 
more deterrents to earnings management in general, including the potential for an IRS audit. 
The overall, compiled taxable, and compiled pass-through samples exhibit significant 
positive parameter estimates on Sales_quint_high and Sales_quint_lowt. Results for the compiled 
company groups suggest that abnormal production may be positive in both the smallest and largest 
companies in those groups.   Results reported in Table 3, Panels A and B, support rejection of 
Hypothesis 3; size does tend to impact the abnormal production of these privately held 
companies. 
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CONCLUSION 
Private small companies have been the subject of much interest by accounting regulators 
recently. Pronouncement SSARS 19 (AICPA 2009) (Codified as AR 9080 and AR 9090) which 
was effective for compilations and reviewed statements prepared for periods ending on or after 
December 15, 2010, provided new guidance for compilations and reviews.  In 2013, the AICPA 
issued the Financial Reporting Framework for Small- and Medium-Sized Entities (FRF for SMEs). 
FRF-MSEs followed the Financial Accounting Foundation’s issuance of the Blue Ribbon Panel 
Report on Standard Setting for Private Companies in 2011. The Blue Ribbon Panel (BRP) 
Report noted that many private companies report financial information under some Other 
Comprehensive Basis of Accounting (OCBOA) than GAAP.  Apparently, this study is the first 
study that compares reporting practices of companies whose financial statements are compiled and 
those that are reviewed. 
My study is subject to several limitations. I only analyzed data from manufacturing 
companies because, due to data limitations, my study focused on inventory and production 
activities management and reporting. Earnings management patterns may differ in other ways 
between taxable and nontaxable small companies, and compiled and reviewed financial statements, 
in other industries. Kvaal et al. (2012) found differences in the real earnings management patterns 
of nonfamily-owned private companies and family-owned private companies. The  Sageworks  
database  did  not  provide  any  information  on  ownership  of companies included in my 
sample.  Future research could address these limitations. 
Overall results indicate differences in abnormal production depending on whether financial 
statements have been reviewed or compiled by an independent accountant; reviewed companies 
tend to exhibit positive abnormal production while compiled companies tend to exhibit negative 
abnormal production. However, for the companies most likely to engage in earnings management 
(indicated by BENCHt), only separately taxable reviewed entities tend to manage earnings higher 
to meet earnings benchmarks. 
Contributions to Literature 
This study extends previous research substantively. Only a few studies have examined 
financial information from large data sets of privately-owned small companies in the United States. 
This is the first study that examines reporting differences related to abnormal accruals between 
financial statements that are compiled and those that are reviewed. The results offer insights to 
users of reviewed and compiled statements about how different entities perhaps manage earnings 
through production and inventory decisions. 
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